A CrestVant Investigation
Content advisory: This report describes sanctions-related shipping practices at the level already published in official government advisories. It is journalism and analysis. It is not a guide, and it does not encourage or assist anyone to violate sanctions or any law.
How we researched this report: We worked from official advisories, court coverage, research institutes and ship-tracking data. The rule was simple: no claim without a published source. Companies appear only where a government has listed them, and a listing is not a verdict. Where the public record ran out, we say so.
Picture a tanker with no country.
Off France's Atlantic coast, special forces dropped onto the deck of the Boracay, a ship whose papers could not say whom it belonged to. According to the prosecutor, it had sailed from the Russian port of Primorsk carrying about 100 million dollars of Russian oil, with two Russian citizens aboard whom the captain described as "security agents." (eenews)
Pause on that for a moment. A hundred million dollars of crude, a vessel with no flag, and two passengers nobody could comfortably explain. And the charge that stuck, in the end, was almost modest. A French court convicted the captain in absentia of failing to comply with authorities and gave him the maximum of one year in prison and a 150,000 euro fine. (eenews)
That gap between the size of the cargo and the size of the charge is the whole story in miniature. The oil is enormous. The law is slow. The evidence is scattered across registries, sanctions lists, court files and satellite pings, and nobody owns the full picture.
So we went looking for the picture. We read what governments have published, what courts have decided, and what tracking firms can see from orbit. We kept only what we could trace to a document, and we dropped the rest, including a few tempting claims that circulate widely but lead nowhere when you pull the thread.
Counting ghosts
The first surprise is that nobody agrees on how many ships we are talking about.
Depending on who counts, somewhere between 940 and more than 1,900 tankers sail in the shadow fleet, roughly a fifth of the world's tanker fleet. Ukraine's military intelligence listed 1,337 vessels in February 2026, while another count put the figure near 1,140. The maritime analytics firm Windward tracked 1,358 tankers in August, and 77 percent of them already carried a formal sanctions designation. A separate database that merges the American, British, European, UN and Swiss lists counts 1,952 sanctioned vessels, 1,074 of them tankers. (Shadow Fleet by the Numbers in 2026 - Primo Nautic +3)
Why such different answers? Because "shadow fleet" is an informal label, not a legal category. Some counts include only sanctioned ships. Others include ships that behave suspiciously without being listed. The disagreement is not a flaw in the research. It is a clue about how slippery the subject is.
Scale, at least, is clearer. The American Action Forum estimated that the shadow fleet moved about 3.7 billion barrels in 2025, nearly 7 percent of the world's annual crude flows. That is not a back alley. It is a parallel shipping system. (americanactionforum)
Governments have kept adding names, and the fleet has kept sailing. The EU had designated around 632 vessels by April 2026. Yet sanctioned tankers still carried 61 percent of Russia's crude oil shipments in August. (primonautic) (discoveryalert)
One more figure deserves attention, because it says something about transparency itself. Windward could report a registered owner for only 1,150 of its 1,358 tankers, and a manager for only 941. Roughly one ship in five, in other words, carries oil worth millions without a publicly known owner. (windward)
The price of leaving the system
Follow the money and the whole business makes sense, starting with a number that looks odd at first: the discount.
After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Western governments reached for two levers. They would cap what Russian seaborne crude could sell for if Western ships and insurers were involved, and they would squeeze Russia's access to those Western services. The cap now stands at 44.10 dollars a barrel under an EU mechanism that sets it 15 percent below the average Urals price of the preceding 22 weeks. (crudeoilprice)
Notice what the cap does not do. It does not forbid anyone from selling oil. It forbids Western services above the line. A seller who wants more must step outside the Western system, and that means Western ships, Western insurance, and often Western banks.
Stepping outside carries a cost, and the cost appears as a discount to the world benchmark. Argus and IEA data showed Urals trading around 28 dollars below Dated Brent in early 2026, the deepest discount in about three years, as Indian purchases fell. Then the spread moved. One analysis found it narrowing from 24 to 18 dollars across the first half of the year, and between late March and late April, Urals delivered to Indian ports swung from a discount of about 10 dollars to a premium of roughly 8. (crudeoilprice) (discoveryalert)
A premium. For sanctioned oil. That sounds absurd until you read why. Russian crude topped 100 dollars a barrel during Middle East supply disruptions and passed 110 on September 16. When other barrels grow scarce, a risky barrel stops looking like a bargain and starts looking like supply. (unn)
The seller's side of the ledger is just as revealing. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air puts Russia's average production cost near 15 dollars a barrel. Russia's 2026 budget assumed an oil price of only 59 dollars. Even after a hefty discount, a barrel sold in this market earns far above what it costs to pump. (energyandcleanair) (discoveryalert)
Three producers, three very different years
Russia: the fleet that started flying its own flag
Russia runs the biggest operation in this world. It accounts for 585 of 978 cumulative sanctioned tankers, about 1.6 times Iran's total of 364. Windward found 98 tankers re-flagged to Russia across 2025 and 2026, lifting the number of Russian-flagged shadow tankers above 213. (windward) (discoveryalert)
That is a response to pressure, and a clever one. The share of the fleet's oil carried under false flags dropped from 24 percent to 2 percent in a year, and since May no falsely flagged tanker has loaded at Russia's Baltic or Arctic ports. The logic is hard to miss: a ship with a real flag, even Russia's own, is far harder to board on the high seas than a ship with a fake one. (geopoliticalmonitor)
Then came the sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025, which cracked the market into pieces. Kpler recorded the ESPO crude differential swinging from a 2-dollar premium to a 6-dollar discount against Brent, Turkish imports falling 70 percent, and Chinese teapots stepping in. Flows did not stop. They changed lanes. None of the Turkish-bound volumes Kpler examined came from Rosneft or Lukoil, with Tatneft and Rusvietpetro handling the supply instead. (kpler) (kpler)
Iran: one customer, a thousand moving parts
Iran's oil has one dominant destination. The US Treasury said in an April alert that China purchases about 90 percent of Iran's oil exports, with teapot refineries taking the majority. Kpler data showed China bought more than 80 percent of the oil Iran shipped in 2025. (CNBC) (Al Jazeera)
2026 has been wild even by Iran's standards. A US-Israeli war on Iran began in February. In April, the US Treasury sanctioned Hengli, China's second-largest independent refinery, along with about 40 shipping firms and vessels. After a US-Iran deal on June 18, OFAC allowed Iranian oil sales until August 21. Then the picture darkened again. Kpler reported no visible Hormuz crossings by supertankers carrying Iranian crude since mid-July, and about 40 million barrels of Iranian oil sitting on ships in Malaysian waters, mostly already promised to buyers. (Iranian Oil Exports to China Face Major Challenges - The China-Global South Project +3)
The volumes tell their own story. Chinese imports of Iranian oil fell to 785,000 barrels a day in June, the lowest since February 2023. And the discount, in that window, was surprisingly small: Iranian Light was being offered at about 3 dollars below the benchmark. (hellenicshippingnews) (chinaglobalsouth)
We could not find a confirmed picture of Iran's exports after August. Say that plainly, because anyone who claims certainty here is guessing.
Venezuela: when the shadow went legal
Venezuela's chapter changed in a single night. US forces seized Nicolás Maduro in a raid on Caracas on January 3, and Washington then eased some sanctions so US companies could buy, sell, transport, store and refine Venezuelan crude, though not produce it. (arabnews)
The recovery came fast. Exports rebounded to about 800,000 barrels a day in January from roughly 498,000 in December, after the Treasury licensed the trading houses Trafigura and Vitol to market Venezuelan oil. US officials said the proceeds would go to a US-overseen trustee. (pakistantoday) (thestandard)
The ships, though, did not retire. One analyst called the global shadow fleet fungible, and in December 17 sanctioned vessels were reflagged to Russia, some of which had once moved Venezuelan oil. A tanker does not care whose barrel it carries. It cares who pays. (CNBC)
The customers
China's teapots
If this story has a center of gravity, it sits in Shandong. Teapot refineries, as China's small independent refiners are called, account for about a quarter of the country's refining capacity. They stockpile and process discounted Iranian and Russian crude, which lets China's state oil giants stay insulated from politically risky trade. (hellenicshippingnews) (Al Jazeera)
Washington has aimed straight at them, and Beijing has pushed back. In May, China announced an injunction blocking US sanctions on five refiners, Hengli, Shandong Jincheng, Hebei Xinhai, Shouguang Luqing and Shandong Shengxing, saying the measures violate international law. The standoff has no resolution yet. (Al Jazeera)
India: adaptation as a strategy
India's behavior reads like a case study in flexibility. When US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil took effect on November 21, Reliance and other refiners said they would stop taking Russian crude from those firms. Reliance later resumed imports from Russian producers that are not sanctioned, for domestic use. (tribuneindia) (nv)
One road runs through a refinery already under European sanctions. Nayara Energy, which has relied entirely on Russian crude since EU sanctions, was India's second-largest importer of Russian oil in the period reported. Rosneft owns 49.13 percent of it. (outlookbusiness) (theglobalstatistics)
The discount worked as a lever. Urals for Indian ports traded at 5 to 6 dollars below benchmark, up from about 2 dollars before the US sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil. (outlookbusiness)
Turkey and the wider map
Turkey cut direct purchases sharply but stayed in the market through different suppliers. China and India together bought about 87 percent of Russia's crude exports since December 2022, according to figures compiled by The Global Statistics. That aggregator builds on public tracking, so treat the share as indicative rather than exact. (theglobalstatistics)
Anatomy of a voyage
How does an unlicensed barrel physically get from a Russian or Iranian port to a refinery? Governments have described the pattern in published advisories, and we stay strictly inside those descriptions.
The US advisory lists disabling or manipulating the Automatic Identification System, falsifying cargo and vessel documents, and complex ownership or management structures. It adds physical alteration of vessel identification, ship-to-ship transfers at night or in high-risk areas, voyage irregularities, and false flags or flag hopping. (hsfkramer) (jdsupra)
Think of it as a chain where each link tries to snap the paper trail.
It begins at the loading port, where the paperwork names a destination. Authorities warn that origin and destination can be disguised. At sea, the pattern gets more interesting. Ship-to-ship transfers, the movement of cargo between vessels at sea, can be legitimate, but the advisory flags them especially at night or in areas considered high-risk. Lloyd's List Intelligence describes multi-leg transfers as one of the core tactics OFAC highlighted in its 2025 guidance on Iran. (ofac state department and coast guard provide guidance to counter illicit shipping and sanctions evasion +2)
Identity is the next battleground. Ships change flags mid-voyage or transmit another vessel's maritime identification number. Windward counted 49 "zombie" tankers hiding under the identity of a scrapped vessel. (lloydslistintelligence) (windward)
Then comes the waiting room. Lloyd's List tracking shows a growing number of stateless tankers loaded with Russian oil anchored in Malaysian waters. And at the end, a refinery. Here the trail often goes cold on purpose. Kpler noted that once crude is refined in China, its origin cannot be separated. (CNBC) (kpler)
A fair warning before we move on. An AIS gap or a ship-to-ship transfer is not proof of anything on its own. The advisory itself notes that such transfers can be legitimate. That caution is why detection depends on patterns rather than single events. The 2025 guidance shifted from watching individual red flags to mapping how they connect across vessels, companies, registries and financial systems. (windward)
The fleet also carries a quieter risk that has nothing to do with sanctions. Incidents involving these tankers have reached about two a month, from groundings and collisions to fires and engine failures, and recovering rescue costs is doubtful when the owner and insurer are unknown. (Wikipedia)
Getting paid without the dollar
Moving oil is only half the puzzle. Getting paid is the other half, and it may be the more inventive half.
Yuan, small banks and a very odd conduit
Chinese teapots are less exposed to US pressure because they pay in yuan rather than dollars, and Beijing raised their import quotas from 140 million tons in 2018 to 257 million. Institutions such as the Bank of Kunlun have been used for payments. (startmag) (startmag)
In October 2025, the Wall Street Journal reported something stranger. According to current and former Western officials, oil purchases are repaid through Chinese state-backed construction in Iran rather than through bank transfers. A financial conduit called Chuxin pays Chinese contractors working on Iranian infrastructure, with the projects insured by the state export-credit agency Sinosure. The report put the conduit at about 8 billion dollars. (How China Secretly Pays Iran for Oil and Avoids U.S. Sanctions +2)
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a US think tank, added a detail that makes you lean in: Chuxin does not appear on China's list of registered banks. (fdd)
A later Reuters report described a variant. Iran used a barter-like arrangement to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and buy billions of dollars of goods from China, including military gear, according to senior Iranian sources and others. One analysis stressed that it is not a literal swap of oil for goods but something closer to a financial pool built around oil revenues. (timesofisrael) (outlookindia)
All of this rests on officials and sources. In the material we reviewed, neither Beijing nor Tehran has confirmed the mechanism.
The token question
You may have heard that oil-linked crypto tokens help smugglers. The record gives a two-part answer, and the first part may surprise you.
The branded oil token failed. Venezuela's El Petro, designed as a stablecoin pegged to a barrel of oil, was the first digital asset ever targeted by US sanctions. It was shelved after failing to attract adoption. (theblock) (fxstreet)
Ordinary stablecoins, however, did real work. Reuters reported that PDVSA used Tether's USDT through intermediaries to bypass sanctions. A Senate Democrats' report said 84 percent of roughly 850 sanctioned Iran-linked wallets used USDT almost exclusively, although blockchain data suggests Tehran's reliance may be easing. The Treasury alleged that a UAE-based broker processed more than 100 million dollars in crypto since 2023 to facilitate Iranian oil sales for the IRGC's Quds Force. Tether froze 344 million dollars of USDT in two wallets linked to Iran. (tether will freeze wallets evading venezuelan sanctions 202404240911 +3)
Russia has used similar tools. Reuters reported that some Russian oil firms use bitcoin, ether and Tether to convert yuan and rupee payments into rubles. (boorghani)
So did tokens "help"? Stablecoins were used, yes. But they leave a trail, which is exactly why blockchain analysts and Tether itself now freeze flagged wallets. We found no evidence that tokens tied to an actual oil asset played any meaningful role.
The middlemen
Between seller and refinery sits a trader, and where that trader sits is no accident.
The Swiss non-profit Public Eye found that in July 2023, 51 percent of Russian crude was bought by traders registered in the UAE and 30 percent by traders in Hong Kong, while the Swiss share had fallen from 47 percent to 5 percent. Neither the UAE nor Hong Kong had imposed sanctions on Russia. (gtreview) (gtreview)
Governments have listed some of these firms, and we repeat the listings strictly as listings.
The US blacklisted over 180 ships and 10 oil trading companies, mostly in Dubai, which Washington said had made more than 300 shipments since 2023. The UK named Litasco Middle East DMCC, a Lukoil-linked trader that, according to the outlet The Insider, was the biggest buyer of Russian oil priced above the G7 cap in 2024, handling about 170 million barrels. In February 2026 the UK sanctioned 48 tankers and 175 companies in the Dubai-based 2Rivers group, which British authorities accuse of being among the largest shadow fleet operators. (Oil Traders Take New US-Russia Sanctions in Stride +2)
The firms tell a different story. 2Rivers, formerly Coral Energy, said it largely stopped trading Russian oil in 2023 and changed its name after a management buyout. A designation is a government's allegation. It is not a court finding. (bairdmaritime)
Another pattern runs inside Russia. Russian producers used domestic market swaps, exchanging oil bound for local refineries with export volumes handled by non-sanctioned firms, to keep supplies flowing to India without breaching sanctions, industry sources told Reuters. One analyst reads the cycle bluntly. After earlier sanctions rounds, designated companies restored sales through intermediary traders, without significant secondary sanctions on their partners. (marketscreener) (evidencity)
Who are the ultimate investors? The honest answer is that the public record cannot say. China and Russia together account for 321 of the 1,150 vessels with a known owner flag. The KSE reportedly estimates that Russia spent about 10 billion dollars building its fleet. Beyond that, we have names of listed entities, not investor lists. (windward) (duke)
Do the futures markets pull the strings?
This is where popular theories run far ahead of evidence, so let us slow down.
Benchmarks matter because everyone uses them as a yardstick. Oil benchmarks serve as reference prices across the industry for both physical settlements and futures and options pricing. A sanctioned barrel is typically priced as a discount to that benchmark, which means the shadow market borrows its price from the regular market rather than setting it. (natlawreview)
Can benchmarks be manipulated? A real case says yes, in principle. In 2022, Glencore and an affiliate agreed to pay over 1.1 billion dollars in criminal penalties and forfeitures, plus 1.186 billion dollars to the CFTC. The CFTC found that from 2007 through at least 2018 the company manipulated or attempted to manipulate oil product prices. According to the CFTC, Glencore traders reported bids and raised bids to Platts 728 times in one November, trying to push a benchmark upward. The regulator said the misconduct lifted Glencore's profits by 320 million dollars. (May 24, 2022 +3)
Now read the fine print, because it matters. That case concerned US fuel oil assessments. It had nothing to do with sanctioned crude. Platts said there was no evidence the attempted manipulation succeeded or that its assessments failed to reflect market value. (shipandbunker)
We searched for court cases or regulator findings linking sanctioned-oil trading to benchmark manipulation, and found none. We are not saying it never happens. We are saying the public record does not show it, and a good investigator does not fill that silence with a theory.
What the record does show is the cap's limited bite. CREA argues that the price cap has failed to impose a durable constraint on Russian crude earnings, working only briefly for Urals. In September 2026, G7-owned or insured tankers carried 30 percent of Russia's seaborne crude and 74 percent of its oil products. CREA estimated that full enforcement of the 44.10 dollar cap would have cut Russia's seaborne oil export revenue by about 16 percent, roughly 1.6 billion euros, that month. (July 2026 — Monthly analysis of Russian fossil fuel exports and sanctions +2)
Two barrels, side by side
Numbers pile up fast in a story like this, so here is the comparison laid out in one place. Read the rows as a map of the differences, not as a tidy dataset: the discount figures come from different bases (FOB, delivered, Dated Brent), so they cannot be lined up like a single series.
Feature
Regular, exchange-linked cargo
Sanctioned or shadow cargo (as reported)
Price reference
Priced against Brent or similar benchmarks
Priced at a discount to the same benchmarks
Discount, Russia
Near the benchmark
About 28 dollars in Feb 2026; 18 to 24 later in the first half; a premium in India in April
Discount, Iran
Near the benchmark
About 3 dollars offered in Aug 2026
Seller's cost
Around the producer's cost
Russia's average cost about 15 dollars a barrel
Insurance and ships
Western insurers, registered fleet
Often outside the Western insurance system
Payment
Dollar banking
Yuan, small banks, barter-like pools, stablecoins (reported)
Ownership visibility
Disclosed registries
About one vessel in five with no reported owner
Main risk
Market price
Seizure, designation, secondary sanctions
And the number everyone asks for: total profit. We looked hard for a credible aggregate figure for the shadow trade and did not find one. Multiplying a discount by a volume produces a headline, but no institution that publishes data on this has endorsed such a number. What the record does support is narrower and still telling: sellers' revenues remain well above their costs at current prices, and the discount is what buyers collect for taking on the risk.
From lists to courtrooms
For years, the answer to a shadow tanker was a list. In 2026, it became a boarding party.
By late June, nine suspected shadow fleet tankers had been seized across Europe since the start of the year, four of them by France, and Britain seized one in the English Channel on June 14. French prosecutors charged the captain of the Tagor with a false-flag violation carrying a 150,000 euro fine after the ship was boarded on May 31. On October 13, France intercepted the DF Peak, formerly the Kaliningrad and flying a Benin flag, about 500 nautical miles south of Réunion. The UK charged the Indian captain of a detained tanker with violating its Russian oil sanctions. (France Seizes 'Shadow Fleet' Tanker, Stepping Up Pressure on Russia +3)
Moscow rejects the premise. The Kremlin called the seizures illegal and compared them to piracy. And the legal ground is genuinely unsettled. Two legal scholars concluded that Russia's claim to one boarded ship appeared effective on the public evidence, which would make boarding it hard to justify as a visit to a stateless vessel. (euronews) (geopoliticalmonitor)
Whether any of this changes the trade is an open question. About two dozen ships linked to the fleet have been detained since December 2024, yet shadow tankers still delivered 121 cargoes of Russian oil in September 2026 alone, and France released at least two detained tankers after their owners paid fines. (geopoliticalmonitor)
The pressure is moving to the money, too. The US Treasury warned banks that they risk sanctions over links to Chinese refineries handling Iranian oil. (CNBC)
What we could not prove
A report earns trust partly by listing its gaps. Ours:
The total profit of the shadow trade remains unknown, since we found no credible published estimate. The ultimate investors behind the fleet cannot be named from public sources, only the listed entities around them. We found no case or regulatory finding that ties sanctioned-oil trading to benchmark manipulation. Iran's export position after August is unclear in the reporting we could verify. The payment pools rest on official and anonymous sources and have not been confirmed by the governments involved. And on contract design, the public record describes outcomes such as swaps, intermediaries and renamed firms, but no case we reviewed lays out the legal drafting itself. We will not guess.
Our Take: The Barrel That Refuses to Vanish
What strikes us most about this trade is not its cleverness. It is its patience.
Sanctions rarely make oil disappear. They change its route, its price and its paperwork. Reflagging replaced false flags when false flags got risky. Intermediaries multiplied when listings grew. Yuan and stablecoins stepped in when dollars closed. New buyers appeared when old ones backed away. And all the while, staying in the game kept getting more expensive for ships, captains and traders.
Three things are worth watching next. Will secondary sanctions on buyers become systematic rather than occasional? Will more states test the legal limits of boarding contested ships? And will Iran's exports recover as the Gulf situation evolves?
The question is no longer whether the dark barrel exists. It is who is willing to keep paying for it, and for how long.
Disclaimer
This report is for informational and educational purposes only. It is based on public documents, court reports, research institutions and news coverage available at the time of writing. CrestVant has not independently verified every figure, and many data points are estimates that differ by source and method.
Companies, individuals and vessels are named only where a government or court has listed or charged them, or where a source has reported on them. A sanctions designation or allegation is not a finding of guilt, and nothing in this report accuses any person or organization. The situation described changes quickly.
This is not legal, financial, investment or compliance advice. CrestVant is not responsible for errors, omissions, or any decision made on the basis of this content. Please check the original sources and consult a qualified professional before acting.
All names and trademarks belong to their owners. CrestVant is not affiliated with any company or government mentioned.
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